



Never Again? The Institutionalization of Far-Right Negationism and Shrinking Space in Argentina: Impacts on Transitional Justice Trials and Memory Politics

Rosario Figari Layús

University of Bonn, Germany

Abstract

Transitional justice criminal trials and memory policies have been a major step forward in strengthening accountability for human rights violations, while providing recognition and reparation to victims of state crimes and institutionalizing the demand for non-recurrence in Argentina. However, in recent years they have become the focus of serious attacks. The rise of far-right forces, which came to power with the figure of Javier Milei at the end of 2023, has led to the institutionalization of negationist discourses and an increase in the shrinking of spaces for human rights actors along with a reversal of the politics of justice and memory, including the persecution and stigmatization of victims and human rights organizations. The use of defamatory publicity campaigns, one-sided accusations and, above all, the withholding of funding for human rights policies and institutions are seriously hampering the progress of judicial proceedings and other reparation measures. In this context, this article illustrates how, once negationist discourses are institutionalized, legitimized and disseminated in the public sphere, they tend to be translated into concrete consequences that undermine the functioning and scope of transitional justice and memory actors and spaces. In Argentina, the government's anti-transitional justice stance has materialized in specific official measures aimed at undermining four key dimensions of transitional justice functioning and objectives: obstructing investigations, limiting access to information, reducing the public impact of transitional justice and weakening the activism and participation of human rights and victims' organizations.

Keywords: Far-right forces; shrinking practices; transitional justice; negationism; Argentina.

Introduction

Nunca más (Never again) is one of the main mottos and objectives shaping the paradigm of transitional justice (hereafter TJ) in Latin America over the last 40 years. It refers to the establishment of the democratic and peaceful conditions that can contribute to the non-repetition of state and mass violence in post-transitional contexts where systematic human rights violations and mass violence once occurred. *Never again* was also the title of the final report published in 1984 by the Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (CONADEP, National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons) in Argentina, which gave an account of the crimes against humanity committed by the military regime that ruled Argentina from 1976 to 1983. However, in recent years many of the principles contained in *Nunca más* are increasingly being threatened by the arrival to power of the far right and the institutionalization of its ideologies. With the presidential rise of different conservative populist politicians, such as Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil in 2018, Nayib Bukele in El Salvador in 2019, Javier Milei in Argentina in 2023



Except where otherwise noted, content in this journal is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). As an open access journal, articles are free to use with proper attribution. ISSN: 2202-8005 (Online)

and Donald Trump in the United States in 2025, the far-right has become more prominent, impinging on TJ policies and human rights movements, especially in Latin America.

Over the past four decades, Latin America – with Argentina at the forefront – has become the region where the greatest implementation of TJ policies has occurred. TJ concerns the adoption of state and civil society measures and initiatives aimed at addressing human rights crimes and violations, committed within the framework of armed conflicts and/or authoritarian and dictatorial regimes, for the sake of facilitating and consolidating a transition to a peaceful and democratic social order and guaranteeing victims' rights to justice, truth, reparation and non-recurrence (Teitel, 2000). Tools such as truth commissions, reparation programs for victims of heinous crimes, memorials, museums and, notably, criminal prosecutions have become part of common parlance in many of the transitional processes undertaken in multiple countries in the region to address the consequences of massive human rights violations. TJ mechanisms such as prosecutions can offer victims the opportunity of access to more information about the past as well as the chance to speak about their experiences in a public forum and thus become active participants in the justice process. The reparative power of truth-telling has been highlighted by various scholars (Goldstone, 1996; Hayner, 1994; Lawry-White, 2015). Indeed, two of the most acknowledged dimensions of trials, but also of other TJ mechanisms and memory initiatives, are their investigative function and their visibility and impact in the public sphere. According to Shelton (1999, p. 52), “remedies for public wrongs must be seen ... as serving not only private redress but also public policy”. Trials, when conducted as public hearings with space for storytelling and the presence of the public and media, can also have an important impact on the social context and relations in which victims are embedded. If recognition through TJ efforts is so important, it is precisely because of their public nature, paving the way for the facts of past human rights violations to be disseminated to wider sectors of society. Some scholars stress that the public exposure of state crimes during trials, truth commissions and public commemorations can even have a “pedagogical benefit” to wider sectors of society beyond the targeted victims and perpetrators (Di Paolantonio, 2004) and facilitate public debate that was previously foreclosed. Thus, TJ policies can open up the possibility for dialogue and reunion among groups that have been separated for a long time.

Throughout these years, the implementation of TJ initiatives has also had to coexist with the moves of radicalized far-right forces that have stood out for their negationist discourses denying and/or justifying various forms of heinous crimes committed under dictatorships and during armed conflicts in the region. Although some recent work has provided relevant insights into some of the challenges posed by the expansion of populist forces for the continuity of TJ (Couperus et al., 2022; Dias et al., 2024; Gallo & Botelho Soares, 2024), there is still little knowledge about what specifically happens when far-right parties come to power and institutionalize negationist discourses and space-shrinking practices for human rights stakeholders and TJ policy. By analysing the impact of the current far-right Milei government on TJ policies in Argentina, this article seeks to contribute to a better understanding of how the rise of far-right forces and the democratic backlash they generate can have serious negative implications for memory and accountability policies, objectives and key actors, even in the context of a significant and well-established human rights apparatus designed to deal with the crimes of the past.

During the Argentine dictatorship, state repression was systematically carried out by military and police forces that abducted, tortured and, in most cases, murdered and disappeared what human rights organizations estimate to be some 30,000 people. When Argentina returned to civilian rule in 1983, the government of President-elect Raul Alfonsín enacted some relevant initiatives to respond to demands for justice and truth made by survivors, relatives of the disappeared and human rights organizations. Those initiatives included the creation of the CONADEP, tasked with investigating the whereabouts of the disappeared as well as with the so-called “Junta Trial” (1984-1985) to prosecute the Commanders-in-Chief of the first three military dictatorship juntas. Furthermore, several reparation laws for victims of the dictatorship were passed. However, hopes were dashed that most perpetrators would be prosecuted following the adoption in the 1980s of what were called “impunity laws” and presidential pardons granted in the 1990s that foreclosed most of the prosecutions of ex-military leaders for human rights crimes. However, following years of demands from the human rights and victims' movement, in 2003 Argentina's Congress finally repealed the amnesty laws (a decision upheld by the Argentine Supreme Court in 2005), opening a new period of trials for human rights violations. These are ongoing throughout the country. Between 2005 and 2024, 332 verdicts were handed down against 1228 former members of the security forces and civilians for their responsibility in human rights violations (Ministry of Public Prosecution, 2024). These trials, together with other TJ and memory policies, have constituted a major step forward towards strengthening accountability for human rights violations, while providing recognition and reparation to victims of state crimes and institutionalizing the demand of non-recurrence. For these achievements, Argentina has been recognized nationally and internationally, even being described as a champion of TJ and an “exportable model” (Vasquez Caruthers, 2022, p. 39). Against this backdrop, this article aims to address the following questions: What are the main impacts of far-right forces and their institutionalization of negationist rhetoric and practices, including shrinking spaces, on TJ accountability and policies in Argentina? And what form does negationism take and what role does it play in shrinking space in post-transitional contexts? The current backlash against democratic institutions and norms, as well as the dissemination of negationist narratives affecting TJ agendas, is taking place in an ever broader and growing global trend that several scholars and practitioners have described

as “shrinking space”. This involves an increase in persecutory and restrictive practices, targeted in particular at civil society actors, notably those linked to the defence of human rights (Front Line Defenders, 2024; Van Tuijl, 2000). Different forms of violence and various intimidation strategies are being used more and more frequently against civil society activists, albeit under formally democratic governments. This political climate has also been described as “disabled environments” and “restricted operational space” (Borgh & Terwindt, 2012). In Latin America, many NGOs and activists are increasingly being attacked for taking part in peaceful protests, for documenting and publicly denouncing human rights abuses and violations, and for defending their rights and seeking justice, truth, reparation and the non-repetition of violations such as those analysed in this article. While defenders of environmental, land and Indigenous peoples’ rights – mostly in the context of so-called mega projects by extractive industries and big business – are the main targets of killings (Global Witness, 2023), human rights stakeholders involved in TJ and memory policies are also being harshly harassed, stigmatized and criminalized, particularly in those contexts where the far right holds positions of power in state institutions. These complex contexts also raise critical questions for TJ regarding the feasibility of providing truth, justice and reparation to victims in adverse settings.

Argentina has become one of the most striking cases in this milieu. This is partly due to the arrival to power in December 2023 of far-right political party La Libertad Avanza (hereafter LLA) and its leader, Javier Milei, who in various and virulent ways has exhibited disdain for and constantly attacked the country’s outstanding achievements over the last four decades in the field of TJ and in what is known in Argentina as the “Memory, Truth and Justice Policies” for the reparation of victims and accountability of perpetrators of human rights violations committed during the last civilian-military dictatorship in Argentina (1976–83). As shown in this article, after more than a year of Milei’s administration, it is clear that the institutionalization and attendant legitimization of negationist discourses have also translated into the use of restrictive and intimidating practices that shrink human rights spaces. They have also undermined four key dimensions of TJ’s functioning and objectives: obstructing investigations; limiting access to information; reducing the public impact of TJ; and weakening human rights and victims’ organizations’ activism and participation in TJ. This poses a serious risk not only to the continuity and social effectiveness of TJ, but also to the security of the individuals and organizations involved.

The findings presented here are the result of a qualitative research methodology approach, drawing on a range of secondary sources (press articles, international and local NGO and government reports). The analysis was carried out through two main methods: the collection and systematization of published official data on current government policies on TJ and human rights in Argentina; and research into journalistic sources on the current administration in Argentina. The article is organized in three sections. It first provides a conceptual perspective on the meaning and implications of negationist discourse and shrinking spaces and their insidious impact on democratization processes, human rights and civil society. The second section focuses on Argentina, describing the TJ policies in place there since the 2000s, its advances and challenges in terms of memory, justice and reparation policies, as well as justice for crimes against humanity committed during the dictatorship. Finally, the article analyses the concrete consequences of the arrival of Javier Milei to power and offers some preliminary conclusions on the relationship between negationist discourse and memory politics regarding human rights and justice outcomes. Finally, by analysing the impact of far-right government agendas on TJ in Argentina, it is important to consider the topicality of this process, which is still ongoing. Long-term outcomes are yet to be seen.

The Expansion and Institutionalization of Far-Right Negationism

The term “negationism” was originally used to describe narratives that denied the Holocaust by claiming it to be an exaggeration or lie (Eatwell, 1991; Evans, 2001). Once the Holocaust was constituted as paradigmatic to memory culture, from the late 1960s onwards, negationism extended to other cases in which the historical record was denied, concealed or distorted, especially in relation to acts of mass violence, genocide and massacres, such as those that took place in Latin America between the 1960s and 1980s (Lvovich & Grinchpun, 2022). In recent years, the term has been extended further still to account for the denial of current concerns, rather than past ones, such as those related to scientific development, climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly by far-right forces (e.g., Hochsprung Miguel, 2022).

Negationist discourses can take different forms, such as the relativization or banalization of events that took place (Lvovich & Grinchpun, 2022). Relativization occurs when the severity of the crimes committed is diminished. Banalization involves the omission and/or distortion of historical facts and processes to condition their interpretability and meaning in the present. Once it is accepted that proven criminal historical facts can no longer be denied, justification strategies can be deployed to relativize the gravity of crimes and lend them validity or legitimacy. All these different forms of denial have taken place not only in Argentina, but also in many other contexts.

Negationist discourses are usually part of broader political ideologies. Indeed, several works have shown that the ideological position of a government has a strong influence on the specific TJ and human rights agendas implemented in a given context

(Dias et al., 2024; Gallo & Botelho Soares, 2024; Nalepa, 2021; Solís Delgadillo, 2015). In particular, the surge of far-right populist parties and the support for and dissemination of negationist narratives and politics are part of a traceable and growing global trend across the world. In Western Europe, several investigations have analysed the ideological positioning of current far-right parties, linking them to the fascist authoritarian past (Couperus et al., 2022) of countries such as Italy (e.g., Bolzoni, 2022) and some members of the Alternative for Germany party to neo-Nazi rhetoric in Germany (Kaya, 2021). Worryingly, this party received more than 20 per cent of the vote in the last national elections in February 2025. Similarly, some studies show how the populist far-right party VOX in Spain also uses memory of the Franco dictatorship as a political tool, although it stops short of presenting itself as a direct successor to the authoritarian regime (Ferreira, 2019). Indeed, this coincides with the strong opposition of VOX to the adoption of TJ measures by the left-wing PSOE in recent years (Dias et al., 2024, 779).

In Latin America, several scholars have examined how the former presidency of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil (2018–22) promoted a re-evaluation of the political memory of the military dictatorship, consistently denying that there had been a dictatorship in the country and justifying the use of torture during that period (Benetti et al., 2020, Gallo & Botelho Soares, 2024; Schneider, 2020). Contrary to the TJ policies established in the last three decades – mainly by the first Leftist administrations of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2002–06, 2007–10) and later by Dilma Rousseff (2011–16), who together ruled for more than a decade, Bolsonaro actively justified the repression deployed by the Brazilian military regime (1964–85). So too did the administration of Ivan Duque (2018–22) in Colombia, which disseminated negationist narratives about the internal armed conflict that had dogged the country for more than 50 years. An example of this was the appointment of Ruben Acevedo as director of the previously prestigious National Historical Memory Centre (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica). Acevedo claimed that no armed conflict existed, only terrorism, thus denying the responsibility of the security forces for serious human rights violations and marking a backslide in memory reconstruction of state-sponsored wrongdoing (Cardenas Castañeda, 2024; Torres Ayala, 2020). Indeed, a review of the political positions of Latin American right-wing or far-right governments towards TJ and memory politics in recent decades makes it clear that the right is either less amenable or even opposed to the implementation of reparations and accountability measures (Figari Layús, 2020; Solís Delgadillo, 2015,). This is particularly so because in many cases there is a close political and ideological proximity between far-right sectors and those involved in past state violence exposed by TJ mechanisms. Indeed, in Latin America, most of the Southern Cone dictatorships exhibited a far-right ideology and mainly targeted those individuals and groups they deemed left-leaning or progressive.

Negationist discourses are characterized by their disregard for historical evidence and proven scientific research, distorting available information and knowledge to earn the position of the “truth possessors” in a hegemonic struggle over the representation of the past (Ranalletti, 2010, p. 161). Negationists discredit the testimonies of survivors and the systematic extermination of individuals and groups, as ratified by research, judicial investigations and other TJ mechanisms. Thus, negationism constitutes a deliberate lie for political ends, becoming an apologia for a criminal political regime (p. 162).

The institutionalization of negationist ideologies has the potential to foster consensus around distorted constructions of the past and to legitimize the attendant intimidation measures aimed at silencing human rights and TJ activists. These restrictions are part of a “space-shrinking” trend observed in different regions of the world. The phrases “shrinking civic space” (Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2014), “closing space” or, in particularly drastic cases, “no space for civil society” (Albrecht, 2017) have been widely used in recent years to describe the growth of state measures aimed at restricting the work of different civil society actors, including human rights defenders. As several reports show, human rights defenders in different fields – TJ, the environment, LGBTIQ+ and so on – are increasingly becoming targets of different intimidations, funding cuts, criminalization, defamation, threats and violence (Front Line Defenders, 2024). It is worth noting here that the trend towards space-shrinking and increased authoritarianism is not exclusive to far-right governments, but is observable in many recent contexts where far-right parties have come to power (Couperus, 2022; Gallo & Botelho Soares, 2024). Indeed, when far-right forces and ideologies enter institutional spaces and become officialized, the risk of legitimizing authoritarian and negationist discourses, as well as space-shrinking practices, is enormous – all while delegitimizing international human rights norms and undermining democracy. As the Argentine case shows, the institutionalization and thus officialization of negationist narratives usually translates into restrictive and intimidating practices aimed at shrinking democratic space for the defence of human rights, thus limiting the public impact of TJ mechanisms and weakening already established human rights norms and policies, the respect and fulfilment of which may counter their political, economic and social interests.

The End of Argentina's Human Rights "Golden Age" and the Rise of the Far-Right

The 2000s have been described by several scholars as a "golden age" for the left in Latin America (Levitsky & Roberts, 2011; Weyland et al., 2011), leading to the advancement of several progressive rights in favour of groups that had long been marginalized. In Argentina, this shift to the centre-left was the hallmark of Peronist President Néstor Kirchner (2003–07), and later of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007–15), whose governments supported and gave space – though not without their challenges and differences – to the voices of the human rights and victims' movements that in the 1980s and 1990s had played a key role in the struggle for memory, truth and justice for the crimes of the dictatorship, as well as to collectives with gender and diversity demands (especially feminist and LGBTIQ+ rights). These groups have today become the target of attacks by the extreme right.

From the moment Néstor Kirchner came to office in 2003, he spoke out strongly against the crimes of the dictatorship and called for the annulment of the so-called "impunity laws" of 1986 and 1987 that hindered the prosecution of those responsible for crimes against humanity. These laws were declared unconstitutional by Congress in 2003 and by the Supreme Court in 2005, giving rise to a new period of human rights violation trials that are ongoing today. This marked a very significant change in state policy and narrative through the acknowledgement of the seriousness of the crimes committed by the civilian-military regime. In this sense, publicity and information about trials and the content of verdicts and testimonies have been crucial to their social impact in Argentina. The public hearings afforded survivors a public voice, as they were able to describe a wide range of their own experiences. The institutionalization of the acknowledgement of dictatorship crimes was also reflected in other relevant memory and human rights policies, such as a purge of many top-ranking officers from the military (Roehrig, 2009, p. 737) and the deployment of a multiplicity of symbolic reparation policies, including the creation of the so-called Sites of Memory (Espacios de Memoria) in reference to the transformation of several former clandestine detention and torture centres across the country. These memory museums and memorials were opened to the community (Schindel, 2012). Over the last two decades, many public events have been organized around the trials and Sites of Memory, such as commemorations, guided tours, book launches and even music festivals; these have allowed survivors and activists, as well as other sectors of society who may previously have remained largely uninvolved, to come together. As shown below, it is this public dimension of TJ that has become one of the main targets of Argentina's far-right government.

With the inclusion of these measures in the government's agenda, the state assumed a prominent role in the development and progress of TJ policies, recognizing and enforcing the right of victims to access justice and truth – rights that had been denied to them for decades. Notwithstanding an institutional context that better favoured human rights and TJ, coexistence continued with the denialist narratives of pro-military groups that vindicated the actions of the civilian-military dictatorship, and opposed the trials and truth, memory and justice initiatives. Indeed, victims, human rights stakeholders and court staff taking part in the human rights prosecutions repeatedly reported being the target of threats and security incidents, the most serious of which was the disappearance of survivor and witness Julio López in the city of La Plata in 2006.¹

To a greater or lesser extent and degree of intensity, TJ and memory policies have always been challenged by conservative and pro-military sectors and have coexisted with negationist narratives over the past 50 years (Feld & Salvi, 2019; Lvovich & Grinchpun, 2022). Even before the current far-right administration, TJ had already been severely threatened by the conservative government of Mauricio Macri (2015–19), which was characterized by its contempt for human rights norms and accountability measures. However, the rise to power of the far-right LLA party has given these earlier attacks on TJ a newfound strength and radicalized tenor, worse even than Macri's. Paradoxically, the 40th anniversary of the return to democracy in 2023 became a political shock with the electoral victory of Javier Milei as president and Victoria Villarruel as vice-president, earning 56 per cent of the vote. Their campaign slogans had already signalled vindication of the military dictatorship and denial and/or justification of its crimes. After more than a year of Milei's government, it is clear that the institutionalization, and with it legitimization of negationist discourses, have also translated into the use of restrictive and intimidating practices to shrink human rights spaces. What is paradoxical about this worrying scenario, however, is the strong popular support that such far-right governments continue to enjoy. As some scholars (Caruncho, 2024; Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018) show, far-right leaders share a number of characteristics that have contributed to their success: they emerge in contexts of socioeconomic crisis and growing political polarization, and tend to prioritize issues such as efficiency and security in their public discourses. All of this has allowed them to reach out to the poly-class electorate (Norris & Inglehart, 2019) and to massively capture the vote of citizens who are distrustful of or disappointed with politics. In the Argentine context, widespread support for these far-right parties has further been related to factors such as the impact of the pandemic and containment measures, the economic crisis and thus deterioration of living conditions, and hopelessness about the future and an increase in poverty – all situations that had begun several years earlier.

The Right-Wing Radicalization of Power

While the Argentine case is one of the most extreme in the Latin American region, the increase in and institutionalization of negationist discourses and their violent and authoritarian impacts on TJ and human rights initiatives are not an isolated phenomenon, but rather part of the exponential growth of what is known as “new right-wings” (Semana, 2023). It is undeniable that the rise of far-right forces in the past few years has translated into a democracy backlash, including increased attacks on human rights and memory policies as much as social inclusion policies geared towards the promotion of the rights of historically discriminated groups. Against this backdrop, the concept of “new” right forces has emerged to understand the unprecedented phenomenon of massive societal support enjoyed by these groups in various countries in Latin America. However, in debates about the ideological profile of these far-right parties in the region, such as LLA, some scholars have characterized them as ‘new right-wings’, while others argue that they are not a radical new phenomenon, but rather a continuation of strains within traditional right parties. Nevertheless, this continuity has not prevented the far right from adjusting and adapting its narratives in order to capture a wider electorate. As stated by Morresi and Vicente (2023, pp. 43–45), the Argentine case of LLA reflects both trends, as LLA represents and defends the economic interests of the most conservative and traditional Argentine groups while incorporating some new contemporary elements, such as its disruptive and “anarcho-capitalist” rhetoric, the use of social media and an aim to appeal to the youth electorate.

There is considerable scholarly consensus that the political proposals of the far right are at odds with the expansion of progressive values and rights that have been gaining ground over time in regard to transitional justice, human rights, gender inclusivity and identity politics, reproductive rights, minority rights, environmental protection and so on (Mudde, 2007; Rovira Kaltwasser, 2023). Now, even though the far-right is generally critical of the traditional right wing and seeks to differentiate itself from and sideline it by winning over its voters, there are often alliances and cooperation among them, either implicitly or explicitly, to varying degrees. In many cases, such cooperation is due to the fact that there are often common interests, especially – but not only – economic ones, as the Argentine case shows. According to Vommaro (2023), Milei and its LLA political party have developed a series of innovative rhetorical and political proposals. Many of them are quite opportunistic, considering the crisis of traditional parties and coalitions in the 2023 election. Nonetheless, the LLA still benefits the same private sectors of the economy as the traditional right wing, such as Mauricio Macri’s PRO party. It is therefore not surprising to see strategic alliances between the two parties, both in the 2023 runoff election and in the inclusion of PRO members in the current libertarian government.

At the same time, in recent years LLA has reinforced its conservative discourse against progressive rights (Morresi & Vicente, 2023, pp. 67–68). For example, in previous electoral campaigns – first in 2021 and then in 2023 – Milei intensified his conservative positions on moral and sociocultural issues, becoming quite outspoken against abortion and women’s and LGBTIQ+ rights. This libertarian position entails a criticism of a welfare state – that is, a strong and present role of the state as guarantor of social and economic rights and as responsible for the reduction of various kinds of inequality. In fact, the LLA government has so far shown explicit contempt for the expansion of the rights advocated by feminism, social and labour movements, the LGBTIQ+ community, environmental movements and anti-racists, and for the ancestral claims of Indigenous peoples to their territories, as well as other core positions of left and centre-left parties. Milei’s public anti-traditional-right statements are also seen as part of a political strategy to co-opt support from the more reactionary right wing, which was quite effective for his electoral victory (p. 68). Moreover, Argentina went into the presidential election with an economy in crisis and a society hard-hit by high inflation rates and the pandemic (Vommaro, 2023, p. 5). The inability of Argentina’s previous governments – both the Macri administration and the more recent Peronist-Kirchnerist government of Fernandez (2019–23) – to stabilize the economy sparked resentment towards the political establishment, which was very shrewdly exploited by Milei’s libertarian and populist discourse against what he called *la casta* (“the caste”), a concept used by him to exacerbate indignation and discontent among a large swathe of voters and the ruling class with regard to the country’s situation. This kind of rhetoric is one reason why Milei’s ideology has been described by some authors as “populism” – that is, a discourse that portrays society as divided between two opposing groups, “the people” versus “the corrupt” (Rovira Kaltwasser, 2023). A criticism of political caste is combined with a clearly libertarian critique of the state, radicalizing the naturalization of economic inequality as defended by the far-right (Luna & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2014). As seen in countries where the far right has come to power, such as Brazil with Bolsonaro and El Salvador with Bukele, this rhetoric frames these rights movements and their achievements as part of a global ill, with local manifestations, positioning the government to correct what they consider to be “deviations” (Rovira Kaltwasser, 2023, p. 3). On this basis, far-right populists advocate for dismantling public social safety nets, claiming that the market is the most efficient – and, according to them, just – allocator of resources. The LLA administration in Argentina represents a turning point in the political, economic, social and human rights realms, and marks a serious rupture in the agenda of memory, truth and justice – in stark contrast to recent Argentine history, as described below.

Negationism in Power: The Transitional Justice System Under Siege

During his election campaign, and once in office, Milei and other members of the LLA government explicitly demonstrated their contempt for internationally accepted human rights norms and local gains in transitional justice over the past 40 years. The LLA government has continually downplayed the severity of the crimes committed during Argentina's military dictatorship; through a series of statements using negationist and relativist language, it has referred to state repression as 'excesses' rather than acknowledging the systematic human rights violations that led to the disappearance of thousands of people. For instance, in a presidential debate Milei used old and tired discourses to deny and legitimize the actions of the armed forces by equating and framing illegal state violence during the military regime to acts of "war". This rhetoric has been used by the military and related ideological groups ever since the dictatorship itself (Lvovich & Grinchpun, 2022; Ranalletti, 2010). While the public discourse employed by the Milei administration in reference to the dictatorship is not new, it reveals an important ideological and policy turn from the official and institutionalized interpretation of the past by previous Kirchnerist governments. The characterization of the dictatorship as a "war" between two equal parties, rather than as a regime of state terror and genocide, not only denies the prior official interpretation but also all national and international judicial rulings that proved the systematic use of illegal repression in the 1970s and 1980s. With Milei and Villarruel's arrival to the government in 2023, what had previously been residual negationist discourse against policies, actors, victims of state terrorism and human rights organizations came to assume an official character.

Just over a year into the far-right Milei administration, the government has adopted nothing but denialist positions and offensive statements against TJ and human rights movements. The current vice-president, Villarruel, is the daughter of a military officer who was active during the dictatorship. She is a well-known lawyer who, in previous years, defended former military officers accused of crimes against humanity and supported the so-called "theory of two demons", a narrative that equates the seriousness of crimes perpetrated by state agents or state terrorism with the acts of violence committed by guerrilla organizations (Feierstein, 2018). She discredits the human rights movement, lauding the actions of the armed forces throughout the dictatorship. Villarruel, Javier Milei, Security Minister Patricia Bullrich and other top officials of the current government characterize the trials of crimes against humanity as 'acts of harassment and humiliation' against the armed forces, and describe memory and human rights education policies as "indoctrination" (Cels, 2024). There are many derogatory expressions and rhetorical strategies used by the government to devalue the longstanding struggle and demands of human rights organizations. One of the most common, also used by the pro-military sectors, is a so-called "numbers battle", initiated during the dictatorship itself, that questions the "30,000 disappeared" statistic, the historical drumbeat of the human rights movement in Argentina. In the 1980s, CONADEP had documented 8960 cases of disappearance, although the true number is believed to be much higher (2013, 297). Human rights organizations have estimated 30,000 disappeared, venturing that for each known disappearance, two had not been made public (Filc, 1997, p. 37). Other estimates oscillate between 12,000 and 20,000 persons (Calveiro, 1998, p. 29). Indeed, even today it is still impossible to know the exact number of disappeared persons in Argentina. The state needs to conduct a proper investigation to arrive at an official number. Regardless, the number of disappeared people is not really the relevant point, but rather the government's open provocation to attack and discredit the human rights movement. For instance, on the occasion of the 48th anniversary of the coup d'état of 24 March 2024, Milei's government officially denied the statistic of 30,000 disappeared during the dictatorship, posting a video on an official government social media account stating that the figure was "made up" (Clarín, 2024). On 2 April 2024, Milei used the 42nd commemoration of the Argentine landing at Malvinas to launch a slogan for the future; in it, he urged "reconciliation" with the Armed Forces.²

This approach seeks to deny, justify or even vindicate the military's actions during the dictatorship and to endorse state violence in the present against all those who opposed the governmental agenda. Thus, the arrival to power of far-right actors has not only meant an institutional setback for human rights norms and policies as a whole; while their very continuity has been jeopardized, so too has the safety of individuals and organizations involved in human rights work, as we will see below.

Acts of vandalism of human rights sites, symbols and organizations have increased during Milei's government, though they also occurred in the past. In particular, during the pandemic and Alberto Fernandez's Peronist government, we witnessed a large expansion of far-right movements, with some of their members even becoming deputies in the Argentine Congress. Dissatisfaction with pandemic measures became a breeding ground for the rise of this type of ultraconservative force and its negationist discourse. Thus, as early as 2021, attacks were reported that included the destruction with a hammer of a Mothers of Plaza de Mayo handkerchief, broadcast on TikTok; the striking of the number "30,000" at remembrance sites for those who disappeared during the dictatorship; and insults written on memorial murals and across handkerchiefs painted on the ground at Plaza de Mayo (Bullentini, 2021). The activists and artists that created – and later restored – these popular expressions have attributed the vandalism to the "emboldening of negationist attitudes", which they tie to the arrival in national Congress of LLA deputies regarded as "pro-dictatorship" ("Vandalizan homenajes a víctimas de la dictadura en Floresta", 2022). The vandalism

against emblematic human rights organizations lends visibility to and reinforces negationist narratives in public spaces, inciting attacks and intimidating actions against the human rights movement and its years-long struggle for memory, truth and justice.

While in previous years Milei was not the main referent in the battle for a “complete memory”, as is the case for his vice president, combatting the human rights movement has become part of his anti-progressive “cultural battle” (Semana, 2023). In her first months in government, Villarruel made public statements related to the attack launched on the historical referents of human rights organizations, such as Estela de Carlotto (from the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo organization) or Taty Almeida (from the same organization, Mothers of Plaza de Mayo). One of the most affected organizations by these extremely violent attacks has been Hijos e Hijas por la Identidad y contra el Olvido (HIJOS, Sons and Daughters for Identity and Against Forgetfulness). This civil society organization represents the children of persons disappeared during the military dictatorship. The organization has been vocal in its criticism of Milei’s government, particularly with regard to its defence of military officers convicted of crimes against humanity. In the past few months, some of its members have been the targets of terrible attacks. For instance, in March 2024, a female activist was brutally attacked and sexually abused in her home in the city of La Plata (a Buenos Aires province) by assailants who threatened her and identified themselves using a slogan linked to President Javier Milei. Before leaving, they scrawled on a wall “VLLC”, a reference to *Viva la libertad, carajo* (Long live freedom, damn it), Milei’s trademark political slogan. According to the organization, the perpetrators of this attack claimed, “We know you work in human rights and we want you to shut up. Next time we’ll kill you” (“Brutal Attack on Rights Activist”, 2024). Human rights groups expressed their horror at the news, raising concerns about how the government’s rhetoric is inciting violence against human rights activists.

Negationism in Action: Defunding and Silencing TJ Voices and Practices

Negationism is much more than words. It does not just exist on a discursive level. Once negationist discourses are institutionalized, legitimized and disseminated in the public sphere, they tend to be translated into concrete consequences that undermine the functioning and scope of TJ and memory actors and spaces. In Argentina, the government’s anti-TJ stance has materialized in specific official measures aimed at undermining four key dimensions of TJ’s functioning and objectives: obstructing investigations; limiting access to information; reducing the public impact of TJ; and undermining human rights and victims’ organizations’ activism and participation in TJ. In particular, these deliberate attacks are being carried out by a combination of constant derogatory expressions against the human rights movement, general budget cuts, defunding and the deliberate dismantling of state structures supporting accountability and reparation programs, as well as civil society work and the explicit control and prohibition of human rights and memory-related activities.

Ongoing trials of human rights violations under the dictatorship are among those TJ endeavours that have become the focus of numerous attacks by the current government. The fact that a primary function of the trials is to punish the perpetrators with whom the current administration has a strong political and ideological affinity puts them under a critical spotlight. Thus, faced with the impossibility of directly suppressing them, the government has found indirect ways to deprive them of the institutional support they need and to obstruct the investigations involved in the trials. One of the first measures of Defence Minister Luis Petri put an end to the work of the Equipo de Relevamiento y Análisis de las Instituciones Militares (ERyA, Armed Forces Archive Survey and Documentary Analysis Team), which, based on the reconstruction of key information from its archival work, used to respond to judicial requests for crimes against humanity trials and to unearth significant information in documents that helped solve several dictatorship-era crimes (Juareguy & Iricibar, 2024). Since its creation in 2010, the group has produced more than 170 reports for the justice system to investigate and prosecute the actions of members of the armed forces during the dictatorship (Bertoia, 2024a). The armed forces have since taken over requests for documentation previously handled by the archives team. However, according to human rights activists, the armed forces are incapable of the same analytical work due to a lack of training; at the same time, it is feared that their work could be politically biased in favour of the military personnel on trial.

Nonetheless, this was not the only defunding measure used to obstruct investigations and public access to information. At the SIDE (Federal Intelligence Service), the Joint Committee on Intelligence Documentation Related to Human Rights Violations, established in 2021, was also closed down. General declassification and public access to intelligence documents from that period have been a long-standing demand of human rights organizations since the return to democracy, but it has never been realized. Even as documents from the CIA and FBI in the United States were successfully declassified, those from SIDE or the intelligence structures of the Argentine Federal Police were not (Cels, 2024). The Committee represented a significant step forward in organizing and potentially initiating the declassification process before its indefinite suspension. As in the case of the ERyA, the government argued that the files should only be accessible through specific judicial request, and answered by the security forces or agents themselves (Cels, 2024).

In the same vein, in August 2024 the government exacted yet another deadly blow to the truth and justice process. Javier Milei issued a decree to shutter a special government unit, the National Commission for the Right to Identity (Comisión Nacional por el Derecho a la Identidad – CONADI), a ministerial body created in 1992 for the collection and analysis of documentation related to potential cases of identity – that is, the investigation into the disappearance of children who were kidnapped as babies during the dictatorship (Juareguy, 2024).³ The government argued that the unit's work overlapped with that of the judiciary when, in fact – as the judges themselves stated – it made the process more effective and efficient (Cels, 2024). All these measures feign an appearance of maintaining access to information while seriously limiting it to exchanges between the judiciary and military archives, to the exclusion of other civilian actors from the investigation process (such as civilian experts who could conduct independent investigations). By monopolizing the management of and access to information among the judiciary and security forces, the government curtails society's access to historical research and precludes its ability to uncover and publicize the truth. It reverses the principle of public access to state documents, making everything classified unless otherwise requested by the judiciary.

Amid this context, in January 2025 it was made public that the navy had ordered the destruction and transfer of documents from its general archive, which contains a variety of documents such as military files, personnel files, birth and death certificates, medical reports and naval bulletins. The documents that were not selected for the new location were classified for “purging” and the head of the Navy authorized that material be shredded (Juareguy, 2025). Fearing that the destruction of documents could hamper the investigation into the torture and disappearances carried out by the navy in various cities across the country – including at the Naval Mechanics School (ESMA), a former secret detention centre where around 5000 people are believed to have been held – human rights groups took the matter to the courts and a judge ordered that the navy preserve documents that could serve as evidence of the dictatorship's crimes and, furthermore, not move or destroy them, but rather prioritize their preservation (Juareguy, 2025).

The state should guarantee both the investigation and preservation of all documents of historical value that contain unique information for judicial investigations and institutional memory; otherwise, it seriously violates the rights of victims, impedes ongoing and even future investigations and breaches the country's international human rights obligations. Indeed, the manifold attempts to obstruct investigations are accompanied by measures that constrain the public reach of transitional justice, by preventing access to documents, blocking publicity or prohibiting the practice of different activities.

As mentioned above, one of the most significant and reparative dimensions of TJ and memory initiatives is the possibility of impacting the public sphere, expanding knowledge about wrongdoing and giving victims' voices broader purchase among wider sectors of the population. To do so, the visibility and publicity of TJ events is a crucial condition for allowing the public debate that was previously foreclosed. Thus, public exposure of TJ activities can open the opportunity for dialogue among individuals and groups. Dismantling mechanisms or bodies that contribute to increasing TJ visibility and publicity not only silences or limits the reach of victims' voices, but also limits space for public debate and awareness-raising about crimes and patterns of violence. These are essential conditions to guarantee non-repetition. In Argentina, the public nature of the trials, through public hearings and TV and online streaming, allowed information about the trials and the content of the verdicts and testimonies to reach a section of the population that would otherwise not have had access (Figari Layús, 2018). This access of the citizenry to public information and the public dimension and scope of TJ have been the targets of defunding and dismantling measures in the Milei administration. In fact, one of the first measures taken to reduce the visibility of the prosecutions was the dismantling of the Programa Memoria Colectiva e Inclusión Social (Collective Memory and Social Inclusion Programme), which had been created to publicize the trials by recording public hearings, therefore acting as an audio-visual archive with educational ends (Zylberman, 2021). Such work was essential to deepen public impact and provide information about the crimes of the dictatorship to different and wider audiences, a goal that does not coincide with the current official negationist agenda. Here we see how the expansion of denialism is based not only on the reproduction and dissemination of distorted accounts of a violent past, but also on the downplaying or silencing of any testimony from victims – themselves living proof – that can challenge and expose the falsehood of negationist narratives in the public sphere.

With the arrival of LLA to power in 2023, strategies to silence civil society actors have been deployed in different ways. These have included not only intensified defunding of JT and human rights activities and programs, but also the explicit prohibition of activities related to memory and the commemoration of dictatorship victims. During that period, at least 814 sites were used for detention, torture and disappearance (Cels, 2024). As explained above, many of these sites were turned into memory spaces and museums. The Sites of Memory in Argentina are part of a government policy in 2011 that has sought to raise awareness of state crimes, to officially recognize them, to disseminate the experiences and voices of victims and to contribute to guaranteeing the non-repetition of the mass atrocities committed during the dictatorship. Such sites are material proof of what happened, and they serve as symbolic reparations for the victims and as places for reflection and formation of a citizenry aware of the value of human rights and democracy. The transformation of illegal detention and torture centres into memorial sites is a global trend,

and Argentina stands out as a reference due to the richness and diversity of its memory projects and the legal framework supporting them.

During the first year of the far-right administration, as part of the attacks on these memory policies, the government cut funding for Sites of Memory and dismissed a large proportion of their workers, making continuity of their activities almost impossible. Furthermore, planned infrastructure projects were suspended, including archaeological excavations and conservation efforts at locations that also serve as judicial evidence (Cels, 2024). Hundreds of human rights workers in government agencies, and research and investigative organizations, have been laid off or fired as part of the government's austerity policy. State agencies, including the Archivo Nacional de la Memoria (National Archive for Memory),⁴ the Registro Unificado de Víctimas del Terrorismo de Estado (Central Registry for Victims of State Terrorism)⁵ and the Haroldo Conti Cultural Centre have also suffered either serious staff cuts or been shuttered indefinitely.

Along with the dismantling of state agencies supporting TJ initiatives, the Milei government has consistently shown its contempt for human rights organizations, none of which has ever received an invitation from any official of the current government. In a further attempt to undermine their work, the government decided in 2024 to cancel all subsidies that for decades had been granted to human rights organizations, such as the Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo, for their search for disappeared children ("El Gobierno desfinancia a Abuelas", 2024). The withdrawal of economic aid to civil society organizations in a context of extreme economic crisis and inflation leaves them in a critically vulnerable situation; some do not know whether they will have to close their doors in the near future. The lack of resources is exacerbated in a context where changes to international cooperation – especially from Europe and the United States, which used to financially support many of the human rights organizations in Latin America – are also reducing their budgets, partly due to the arrival of far-right governments in their countries (Wola, 2025).

The attack on TJ endeavours and stakeholders has gone one step further in recent months with a prohibition on public events organized together with human rights organizations at the Sites of Memory. As explained before, over the last two decades, various public activities have taken place to commemorate and publicize the crimes committed in the 1970s. Public art exhibitions, guided tours, book launches and even music festivals have allowed survivors and activists, as well as other sectors of society that may previously have remained largely uninvolved, to learn more about the past and generate space for dialogue. Thus, with just hours before show time in February 2025, a judge ordered the cancellation of a trap concert scheduled to take place at the ex-ESMA memory site. The decision came after the Justice Ministry petitioned the justice to stop the event. The scheduled concert was by Milo J, an eighteen-year-old rising star of the Argentine trap scene whose grandmother was a victim of the dictatorship. The concert was free and 20,000 people had registered online to attend. This ban was followed by others, such as the cancellation of a memory and resistance festival that was to take place at a Site of Memory in the city of Mar del Plata. In fact, since then, the Minister of Justice has issued a new control regulation stating that no activity can take place at Sites of Memory without government authorization, which has led to the immediate cancellation of all their planned activities, including book presentations, public talks and meetings (Del Bianco, 2025). All these activities would have been open to the community.

Many of Argentina's Sites of Memory, including the former ESMA, have a mixed management model, meaning joint decision-making by government officials and human rights organizations like the Mothers and Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo and HIJOS. Mixed models of memorial site management are internationally favoured because they safeguard a degree of independence from government agendas and require negotiated decision-making, which is essential for a diversity of perspectives and the avoidance of authoritarian and arbitrary actions by state bodies (Instituto de Políticas Públicas en Derechos Humanos, 2012, p. 29). The new governmental requirement of authorization for every potential activity is a severe control that excludes any consultation or dialogue with civil society organizations. This leads to worrisome hierarchization and stifled participation, silencing the perspectives of civil society and increasing authoritarianism. While shutting down human rights activities, the government has supported the organization of several official commemorative events to pay tribute to the dictatorship and military victims who died as a result of the actions of illegal armed organizations in the 1970s. Relatedly, retired military officers even held a commemorative event at the emblematic ESM with the Ministry of Defence's endorsement (Bertoia, 2024b). Here we see once again how the strategy of denial works: displacing and silencing the voices of victims, occupying their traditional sites of memory and reparation, especially in public space, and upraising the narratives of those who defend the state repression of those years.

Several demonstrations under the motto "without workers, there is no memory" have taken place to oppose layoffs, dismantlement and authoritarian measures ("Thousands Descend on Ex-ESMA Site", 2025). However, the government has shown indifference and offered no space for dialogue. The withdrawal of funding and mass dismissal of organizational staff not only silences ongoing public debate and dialogue, but also denies the once official recognition of the state's responsibility

for the crimes it has committed, a necessary condition for the *Nunca más* for which so many in the country have been fighting for decades.

Along with these anti-TJ and human rights policies, the implementation of new measures that restrict the free expression of current social movements and aim to reinforce the role of the military in internal public security issues is worrisome. The negationist positions on the dictatorship and the legitimization of state violence serve current security and defence positions. The shrinking space of critical civil society actors and social movements through increased threats and repressive measures is reflected in the new police protocol authorizing the use of high-toxicity gases against anyone obstructing public roads while protesting. Since Milei took office in December 2023, poverty in Argentina has risen to 53 per cent, while social protection measures are being cut and their reach is inadequate (“La Argentina de Milei”, 2024). All the while, the government is pushing for tax reductions for the country’s wealthiest sectors (Cels, 2024). This economic policy has led to an increase in social mobilization by laid-off public employees, retirees, leftist and opposition activists, and cultural program defenders, and has been met with severe repression by the government in Milei’s first year as president. In all of these protests, the police severely injured journalists and media workers covering the events. This fits into a broader strategy of attacking press freedom and the public’s right to information. These practices have been harshly criticized by international organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (“UN Rights Office”, 2024) and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR, 2024).

Conclusions

The formulation and implementation of TJ, memory and human rights measures, particularly in cases involving judicial processes, are a field of contestation, not only about the reconstruction of the past, but also about current actors and interests. While reactionary and negationist discourses that vindicate crimes against humanity are hardly a new phenomenon within and beyond Latin America, Argentina’s case shows the recent emergence of a process to institutionalize such discourses at different state levels. This institutionalization and consequent attempts to delegitimize a consensus that was all but consolidated on human rights issues has a serious negative impact on memory, truth and justice processes, as well as for the actors engaged in supporting these TJ initiatives. Thus, the negationist discourse of Milei’s government has very concrete consequences for human rights policies and the harassment of those advocating them. This rhetoric is coupled with political gestures and specific actions – such as defunding key state agencies – aimed at hindering the process of judicial investigations into crimes against humanity, hampering access to public information and censoring civil society voices and activities. This creates an institutional framework that allows those who were already acting marginally against memory, truth and justice policies to act more brazenly without fear of sanction. In other words, the arrival of a far-right party in power presented an opportunity for negationist groups to emerge from the shadows into the mainstream. The institutionalization of negationist discourses operates by lending social legitimization to the actors that reproduce them, while shrinking space for human rights organizations, re-victimizing survivors of state violence and undermining state obligations under international human rights treaties.

Beyond fomenting societal uncertainty about the past, negationism encourages or tolerates hateful narratives and aggressive and discriminatory actions by certain state and non-state actors that can result in human rights violations, censorship and increased authoritarianism in the present. Thus, the defence of truth, memory and justice policies amounts to more than the protection of symbols, public policies and jobs. Safeguarding memory initiatives is essential for preserving the very conditions that enable dissent, dialogue and advocacy for the non-recurrence of violence and the recognition of difference - foundational pillars of a democratic and inclusive society. It is a way of setting limits and sending a clear message to those who seek to impose a regime through violence, terror and authoritarianism that they will be remembered and held accountable. Far from only being the way we recount and remember the events of a violent past, memory politics determine what we as a society will consider acceptable or unacceptable for the generations to come, so that we can truly say *Nunca más*.

Acknowledgment

I would like to thank Jeanine Legato for her great editorial support and precise suggestions, which significantly improved this text.

Correspondence: Rosario Figari Layús, Assistant professor at the Institute of Sociology, University of Bonn, Germany. rfigari@uni-bonn.de

¹ Julio López, a survivor-witness, was disappeared from the province of Buenos Aires after he testified in the case brought against former superintendent Miguel Etchecolatz, in charge of 21 clandestine detention, torture and extermination centres. His whereabouts remain unknown as of March 2025 and those responsible for his disappearance have yet to be identified.

² In the Argentine context, this notion has been used as a synonym for impunity and was primarily used to justify a public stance of “forgive and forget” towards past crimes. The term “reconciliation” has often been invoked as both the objective of, and justification for, issuing amnesty laws and pardons.

³ This unit was also in line with the International Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Right to Identity, which Argentina ratified in 1990.

⁴ The National Archive of Memory, located at ESMA, is where primary source documents related to the dictatorship are catalogued and used as a valuable resource for criminal prosecutions.

⁵ Responsible for compiling and updating a database containing systematic information on the victims of the dictatorship’s illegal repressive measures.

References

- Albrecht, S. (2017). Shrinking, closing, shifting: A changing space for civil society. *Alliance Magazine*. <https://www.alliancemagazine.org/blog/shrinking-closing-shifting-changing-space-civil-society>
- Bertoia, L. (2024a, March 30). Luis Petri desmanteló el área de Defensa que investiga los crímenes de la dictadura. *Página 12*. <https://www.pagina12.com.ar/725130-luis-petri-desmantelo-el-area-de-defensa-que-investiga-los-c>
- Bertoia, L. (2024b, May 19). Los dinosaurios volvieron a la exESMA para reivindicar la dictadura. *Página 12*. <https://www.pagina12.com.ar/737910-los-dinosaurios-volvieron-a-la-exesma-para-reivindicar-la-di>
- Benetti, P., Cateb, C., Franco, P., & Osmo, C. (2020). As políticas de memória, ver- dade, justiça e reparação no primeiro ano do governo Bolsonaro: Entre a negação e o desmonte. *Mural Internacional*, 11, 1–20.
- Bolzonar, F. (2022). Dealing with a difficult past: Historical memories of the Vichy regime and fascism in the ideology of the Rassemblement National and the Lega. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 31(2), 363–373. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2022.2056730>
- Borgh, C., & Terwindt, C. (2012). Shrinking operational space of NGOs: A framework of analysis. *Development in Practice*, 22(8), 1065–1081. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41723169>
- Brutal attack on rights activist rocks Argentina on eve of coup anniversary. (2024, March 21). *Buenos Aires Times*. <https://www.pagina12.com.ar/387391-pisotear-la-memoria-por-que-se-multiplico-en-los-ultimos-mes>
- Bullentini, A. (2021, December 6). Pisotear la memoria, por qué se multiplicó en los últimos meses la vandalización a los símbolos de memoria, verdad y justicia. *Página 12*. <https://www.pagina12.com.ar/387391-pisotear-la-memoria-por-que-se-multiplico-en-los-ultimos-mes>
- Calveiro, P. (1998). *Poder y desaparición. Los campos de concentración en Argentina*. Colihue.
- Cardenas Castañeda, L. (2024). Colombia in times of post-truth: The case of the national center of historical memory: A philosophical reflection. *Ánfora*, 31(56), 81–96.
- Carothers, T., & Brechenmacher, S. (2014). *Closing space: Democracy and human rights support under fire*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Caruncho, L. (2024). La extrema derecha en el extremo sur: los liderazgos de Javier Milei y Jair Bolsonaro en Argentina y Brasil. *Revista Temas y Debates*, 48, 61–84.
- Cels – Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (2024). *Terrorismo de estado y políticas de memoria, a seis meses del gobierno de javier milei*. Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales.
- Clarín (2024, March 24). El Gobierno de Javier Milei negó oficialmente la cifra de 30 mil desaparecidos y difundió un relato de cómo se habría creado. www.clarin.com/politica/gobierno-javier-milei-nego-oficialmente-cifra-30-mil-desaparecidos-difundio-relato-creado_0_YwH5izgdNs.html?srsltid=AfmBOooPmot9108Phu8pgLM_3-2SmsdYoYMEC66SzuSY_IZ7NrhMiVqt
- CONADEP – Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas. (2013). *Nunca más. Informe de la Comisión Nacional sobre Desaparición Forzada*. Eudeba-Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires.
- Couperus, S., Tortola, P. D., & Rensmann, L. (2022). Memory politics of the far right in Europe. *European Politics and Society*, 24(4), 435–444. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2022.2058757>
- Del Bianco, C. (2025, February 15). Tras el show de Milo J, el Gobierno extiende la censura a los Sitios de memoria. *Página 12*. <https://www.pagina12.com.ar/804136-tras-el-show-de-milo-j-el-gobierno-extiende-la-censura-a-los>
- Di Paolantonio, M. (2004). Tracking the transitional demand for legal recall: The foreclosing and promise of law in Argentina. *Social and Legal Studies*, 13(3), 351–375. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0964663904044999>
- Dias, A. L., Manucci, L., & Raimundo, F. A. (2024). Populism and transitional justice: Talking the talk without walking the walk. *Acta Política*, 59, 778–796. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-023-00307-5>
- Eatwell, R. (1991). The Holocaust denial: A study in propaganda technique. In L. Cheles (Ed.), *Neo-Fascism in Europe*. Longman.
- El Gobierno desfinancia a Abuelas, en un nuevo ataque a los organismos de DDHH (2024, October 1). *Tiempo Argentino*. https://www.tiempoar.com.ar/ta_article/el-gobierno-desfinancia-a-abuelas-en-un-nuevo-ataque-a-los-organismos-de-ddhh
- Evans, R. (2001). *Lying about Hitler: History, Holocaust and the David Irving trial*. Basic Books.
- Feierstein, D. (2018). *Los dos demonios (recargados)*. La Marea.
- Feld, C., & Salvi, V. (2019). *Las voces de la represión*. Declaraciones de perpetradores de la dictadura argentina. Miño & Davila.
- Ferreira, C. (2019). Vox como representante de la derecha radical en España: Un estudio sobre su ideología. *Revista Española de Ciencia Política*, 51, 73–98.
- Figari Layús, R. (2018). *The reparative effects of human rights trials: Lessons from Argentina*. Routledge.
- Figari Layús, R. (2020). The state against the state: The impact of governmental contradictions on human rights trials and victims in Argentina. In R. Figari Layús, & U. Capdepon (Eds.), *The impact of human rights prosecutions: Insights from European, Latin American, and African post-conflict societies* (pp. 103–122). Leuven University Press.
- Filc, J. (1997). *Entre el parentesco y la política. Familia y dictadura 1976–1983*. Biblos.

- Front Line Defenders (2024). *Annual report on human rights defenders at risk 2023*. Front Line Defenders.
- Gallo, C., & Botelho Soares, F. (2024). Políticas de memoria y gobiernos de derecha en Argentina y Brasil: un panorama sobre los gobiernos de Macri y Bolsonaro. *Revista Temas y Debates*, 48, 23–37.
- Global Witness (2023). *Annual report 2023: Challenging polluters, championing people*. <https://globalwitness.org/en/about-us/annual-reports/annual-report-2023-challenging-polluters-championing-people/>
- Goldstone, R. (1996). Justice as a tool for peacemaking: Truth commissions and international criminal tribunals. *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, 28(3), 485–503.
- Hayner, P. B. (1994). Fifteen truth commissions – 1974 to 1994: A comparative study. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 16(4), 497–655.
- Hochsprung Miguel, C. (2022). A “meada” do negacionismo climático e o impedimento da governamentalização ambiental no Brasil. *Sociedade E Estado*, 37(1), 293–315.
- IACHR – Interamerican Commission of Human Rights (2024) CIDH: Estados deben superar el negacionismo que obstaculiza respuestas estatales efectivas frente a la desaparición forzada, 30 August. www.oas.org/es/CIDH/jsForm/?File=/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2024/200.asp
- Instituto de Políticas Públicas en Derechos Humanos del Mercosur – IPPDH (2012). *Principios Fundamentales para las Políticas Públicas sobre Sitios de Memoria*. https://ippdh.mercosur.int/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Sitios_de_memoria_FINAL_ES_INTERACTIVO.pdf
- Juareguy, M. (2025, February 2). Argentine navy ordered to preserve dictatorship archive. *Buenos Aires Herald*. <https://buenosairesherald.com/human-rights/argentine-navy-ordered-to-preserve-potential-evidence-of-dictatorship-crimes>
- Juareguy, M. (2024, August 14). Milei dissolves investigation unit that helped find dictatorship-era appropriated children. *Buenos Aires Herald*. <https://buenosairesherald.com/human-rights/milei-dissolves-investigation-unit-that-helped-find-dictatorship-era-appropriated-children>
- Juareguy, M., & Iricibar, V. (2024, September 1). This archive team brought dozens of dictatorship criminals to trial. Now it’s gone. *Buenos Aires Herald*. <https://buenosairesherald.com/human-rights/this-archive-team-brought-dozens-of-dictatorship-criminals-to-trial-now-its-gone>
- Kaya, A. (2021). The use of the past by the *Alternative for Germany* and the *Front National*: Heritage populism, *Ostalgie* and Jeanne D’Arc. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 31(2), 318–331. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2021.1981835>
- La Argentina de Milei, un año después: menor inflación pero mayor pobreza. (2024, December 12). *New York Times* <https://www.nytimes.com/es/2024/12/12/espanol/america-latina/javier-milei-argentina-inflacion.html>
- Lawry-White, M. (2015). The reparative effect of truth seeking in transitional justice. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 64(1): 141–177. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589314000645>
- Levitsky, S., & Roberts, K. M. (Eds.). (2011). *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left*. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). *How Democracies Die*. Penguin.
- Luna, J. P., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2014). *The resilience of the Latin American right*. John Hopkins University Press.
- Lvovich, D & Grinchpun, B. (2022). Banalización, relativización, negacionismo. Un escenario en los campos de batalla por la memoria del pasado argentino reciente. *Revista Contenciosa*, 12.
- Ministry of Public Prosecution (2024). *La Procuraduría de Crímenes contra la Humanidad actualiza el dossier con los resúmenes de las 332 sentencias dictadas desde la reapertura de los juicios*. <http://www.fiscales.gob.ar/lesa-humanidad/la-procuraduria-de-crime-nes-contra-la-humanidad-actualiza-el-dossier-con-los-resumenes-de-las-332-sentencias-dictadas-desde-la-reapertura-de-los-juicios>
- Morresi, S., & Vicente, M. (2023). Rayos en cielo encapotado: la nueva derecha como una constante irregular en la Argentina. In P. Semana (Ed.), *Esta entre Nosotros* (pp. 43–80). Siglo Veintiuno.
- Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist radical right parties in Europe*. Cambridge University Press.
- Nalepa, M. (2021). Transitional justice and authoritarian backsliding. *Constitutional Political Economy*, 32, 278–300. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-020-09315-5>
- Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). *Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit and authoritarian populism*. Cambridge University Press.
- Ranalletti, M. (2010). Denial of the reality of state terrorism in Argentina as narrative of the recent past: A new case of “negacionism”? *Genocide Studies and Prevention*, 5(2): 160–173. <https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol5/iss2/4>
- Roehrig, T. (2009). Executive leadership and the continuing quest for justice in Argentina. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 31(3), 721–747. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40389965>
- Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2023). *La ultraderecha en América Latina: de iniciones y explicaciones*. Fundación Friedrich Ebert.
- Semana, P. (Ed.). (2023). *Esta entre Nosotros*. Siglo Veintiuno.
- Shelton, D. (1999). *Remedies in international human rights law*. Oxford University Press.
- Schindel, E. (2012). “Now the neighbors lose their fear”: Restoring the social network around former sites of terror in Argentina. *International Journal for Transitional Justice*, 6(3), 467–485. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijts020>

- Schneider, N. (2020). Bolsonaro in power: Failed memory politics in post-authoritarian Brazil? *Modern Languages Open*, 1(25), 1–11. <https://doi.org/10.3828/mlo.v0i0.324>
- Solís Delgadillo, J. M. (2015). *Los s de la memoria en las agendas políticas de Argentina y Chile*. Eudeba.
- Teitel, R. (2000). *Transitional justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Thousands descend on ex-ESMA site to protest layoffs and affirm human rights. (2025, January 5). *Buenos Aires Herald* <https://buenosairesherald.com/culture-ideas/thousands-descend-on-ex-esma-site-to-protest-layoffs-and-affirm-human-rights>
- Torres Ayala, D. (2020). Museo de Memoria Histórica de Colombia (2012–2019) ¿Un lugar para el diálogo memorial? *Historia Y Memoria*, 20, 135–168.
- UN rights office: Milei's measures undermine human rights. (2024, June 20). *Buenos Aires Herald* <https://buenosairesherald.com/human-rights/un-rights-office-mileis-measures-undermine-human-rights>
- Van Tuijl, P. (2000). *Promoting rights while offsetting risks. An overview of NGOs in a disabled environment*. Civicus.
- Vandalizan homenajes a víctimas de la dictadura en Floresta, Brown y Lomas. (2022, September 8). *Tiempo Argentino*. https://www.tiempoar.com.ar/ta_article/vandalizan-homenajes-a-victimas-de-la-dictadura-en-floresta-brown-y-lomas/
- Vasquez Caruthers, J. (2022). Transitional justice and political opportunism. In N. Weiss (Ed.), *Transitional justice: Theoretical and practical approaches* (pp. 39–73). University of Potsdam.
- Vommaro, G. (2023). *La Ultraderecha en Argentina: entre el oportunismo y la innovación*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
- Weyland, K., Madrid, R., & Hunter, W. (Eds.) (2011). *Leftist governments in Latin America: Successes and shortcomings*. Cambridge University Press
- Wola (2025). La suspensión de Trump de la ayuda internacional estadounidense a América Latina: Una política equivocada. <https://www.wola.org/es/analysis/la-suspension-de-trump-de-la-ayuda-internacional-estadounidense>
- Zylberman, L. (2021). Un archivo insomne. El Programa Memoria Colectiva e Inclusión Social y la filmación de los juicios. *Revista de la Carrera de Sociología*, 11, 64–87.